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Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c), Appellant submits his Reply Brief in support of 
his appeal. References to the record and trial transcript are incorporated in the body of this 
Reply Brief. References to the Transcript and the Record refer to the exhibits on file in this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court's findings awarding direct and indirect costs are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence when the record is replete with admissions that such 
expenses included costs not related to Triple Crown Phase 1. 
During the first phase of developing the property, Respondent developed what is referred 
to as the Belmont and Emerald Subdivision consisting of 40 acres. Appellant was entitled to a 
half interest in the profits from that phase pursuant to the parties' oral contract. Respondent 
acquired Appellant's interest in the profits from Belmont and Emerald by paying Appellant 
$200,000 and agreeing to be solely responsible for all development costs from Belmont and 
Emerald. 
In spite of that agreement, Respondent submitted expenses to be repaid as development 
costs for Phase 1. In Respondent's Reply Brief, they take issue with whether the Order appealed 
from should be reviewed as issues of law or fact. Regardless of which standard is applied, the 
District Court's findings cannot stand as there is no basis to approve the holding. While 
recognizing that findings of fact are reviewed on appeal if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, the record will show that the indirect costs allowed by the District Court 
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were in violation of the parties' agreement to buy out the Appellant's interest in the Belmont and 
Emerald phase. 
The District Court allowed Respondent to recoup $124,564 as an "indirect cost" for Idaho 
Power charges. (R. p. 231 ). The allowance of the charges in question were undisputedly 
incurred during the Belmont and Emerald phase and should have been disallowed under the 
parties' prior agreement whereby Respondent was to pay the development costs of the prior 
phase. Otherwise, Appellant would have to be allowed to share in the profits which he waived. 
The Court's allowance of the entire Idaho Power invoicing violates the standard of reasonably 
implied terms since the only agreement between the parties was that Respondent was to pay all 
the costs from the first phase of development. 
The District Court's Order also allowed reimbursement of $15,029 for Riedesel 
Engineering which were likewise expenses incurred during the Belmont and Emerald phase. 
Consequently, the Riedesel Engineering costs cannot be passed through to Appellant without 
violating the parties' expressed terms that Appellant only pay for expenses associated with Triple 
Crown Phase 1. (R. p. 231) 
The District Court also erred in its finding of allocation of direct costs where it awarded 
charges which were admittedly not for the benefit of Triple Crown 1 properties. In the instances 
provided below there is no dispute that the charges were not for expenses of Triple Crown Phase 
1. For instance, the District Court permitted recovery of $63,694.18 for a pressurized 
irrigation system. (R. p. 229). However, during trial, Respondent admitted that those charges 
included invoicing for supplying irrigation hook-ups for four lots within the Belmont and 
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Emerald Subdivision which had previously not had irrigation water, but were drawing water off 
their own domestic wells: 
A They didn't have individual hookups, if that's what you're saying. They --
the irrigation system, the piping was in. The pipe, the main line was in. If 
what you're driving at is where was the water supplied from, it was supplied 
from the farm irrigation pumps from down on the other end, if that's what 
you're looking for. 
Q My understanding of the facts is that there were or four lots in Belmont and 
Emerald that never had water Triple Crown was put in, and the irrigation system 
was 
three until changed, and a head gate was moved over to the lot 12 pond. Is that 
wrong? 
A When you say you understand they never had water, they didn't have --
Q Irrigation water. 
A They didn't have irrigation water because they hadn't put in the individual 
hookups. The main line was there to hook into, but they chose not to do that, 
to pump out of their wells instead. 
Tr. p. 204, L. 8-25 
A No. And I also didn't allocate any of the Farmore bills from when I put in 
the original system and went forward. Belmont and Emerald were 
serviceable when it was finished. The engineer certified it. 
Q So those four lots in Belmont and Emerald, even though they had no water, you 
considered those serviceable? 
A Even though they had no water. They may not have had their individual 
hookups in. But there was water there. 
T. p.205, L. 9-16 
The Districts Court's reimbursement of these indirect costs directly conflicts with the 
parties' agreement that Respondent pay all development costs of the Belmont and Emerald phase 
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under the terms of Appellant's buy-out from the Belmont/Emerald phase for $200,000. 
Respondent was responsible for payment of all costs associated with the first phase. (R. p. 223). 
Contrary to that agreement, the District Court also allowed Respondent to recoup $124,564 it 
described as "indirect costs" for Idaho Power invoices. (R., p. 231 ). These charges again were 
for prior charges incurred during the Belmont and Emerald development. 
The District Court also reimbursed Respondent $15,029 for Riedesel Engineering 
expenses (R. p. 231) which again violated the parties' prior agreement to be bought out of the 
Belmont/Emerald phase. In fact, Respondent was candid in admitting the charges were for 
properties beyond Triple Crown Phase 1. 
During Cross examination, the Respondent admitted that he had passed through 
Belmont/Emerald expenses: 
Q And those costs, we've seen references both in the billings and in different 
exhibits that Belmont and Emerald expenses are now being asked to be absorbed 
in Triple Crown. Why would that be if you had agreed to accept the expenses of 
Belmont and Emerald? 
A Only, only in the categories of power, the entrance, and the original 
Riedesel 797 billing. Those are the only ones that we allocated. 
Q You're expecting Triple Crown to accept a hundred percent of its expenses for 
the Idaho Power bills associated with its development? 
A Yes. 
T. p. 206, L. 1-12. 
From the above admission, it is clear that Respondent admitted that both direct and 
indirect costs were passed through to Triple Crown from the Belmont and Emerald phase. 
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The District Court's findings regarding development costs are inherently erroneous if the 
Respondent admits the charges for development costs were for the benefit of lots in a different 
phase and were in fact included as part of the charges incurred for irrigation expenses. (T. p. 95, 
L. 1-17 top. 103-1-8 and Defendants' Exhibits 9(b) to 9(e)). (Acknowledging over $63,943 in 
invoicing to both Sliman and Butler Irrigation, Inc., and Farmore of Idaho). 
Additional expenses were approved by the District Court which included charges for a 
storage unit supposedly to house a mailbox. However, on cross examination, Respondent 
admitted that he had paid for a storage unit supposedly to warehouse a mailbox he did not even 
buy for several months: 
Q And then you installed, I presume, a mailbox after you received it sometime in --
when did you receive that mailbox, by the way? You ordered it in the middle of 
September 2015. 
Q So the storage unit was doing what between September and December? 
A I don't know. 
Q Do you think that's a reasonable charge, sir? 
A Somebody's got to pay it. I paid it. It was an expense. Might not have been 
the best, might not have been the best expense, but it was an expense. 
Q Just because you spent the money doesn't mean Mr. Hull had pay for you to have 
a storage unit. 
T. p. 226, L. 23-25; pg. 227, L. 1-11. 
Assuming findings of fact are given deference if supported by substantial and competent 
evidence, they must be supportive of the expense approved. When the party admits that 
expenses sought for reimbursement have included costs beyond the scope of the project, it 
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cannot be reasonable since they are not attributable to Triple Crown. All of the references above 
clearly indicate that the Respondent admitted the expenses noted were either for costs from 
Belmont and Emerald lots, such as the irrigation upgrades or for expenses incurred during the 
Belmont and Emerald development phase for which Respondent was to be solely responsible. 
Those costs cannot, therefore, be reasonable since they had no correlation to Triple Crown Phase 
1. All such "costs" were beyond the subject of this phase of development and should not have 
been approved by the District Court. 
Respondent in this case alleges that the District Court's findings were supported by 
substantially and competent evidence. However, evidence is not supported by substantial 
evidence when a party admits that the expenses being charged were for costs outside the 
development. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in relevant part that: 
A party may raise the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
findings whether or not the party raising the question has made an objection to the 
findings or a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment. 
The case before the Court presents a question as to the adequacy of the findings of the 
District Court, not based on conflicting evidence, but rather on the admission of a party that the 
expenses in this case were incurred specifically for other properties not the subject of Triple 
Crown Phase 1. 
Although Appellant acknowledges for this aspect of the appeal that it carries the burden 
of showing error in the District Court's Findings of Fact, such rule presupposes that there is a 
dispute as to the evidence. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 797 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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In this case, the Appellant seeks reversal of the Trial Court's award of development costs 
when the Respondent admitted at trial that the expenses in question were not for the subdivision 
in question. Respondent has admitted expenses sought to be reimbursed were for expenses 
outside the scope of the property. See, Aztec Ltd, Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 602 
P .2d 64 (1979). 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the Court reviews the rulings of the District Court as either "Conclusions of 
Law" or "Findings of Fact," they are objectionable. In the case of allowed indirect costs, those 
charges specifically should be reviewed as a disputed contract interpretation since they involve a 
contract term that required Respondent to be responsible for all development costs of the 
Belmont and Emerald Subdivision. 
The District Court's rulings on direct costs are likewise objectionable, even under the 
standard of being supported by substantial and competent evidence. In the categories outlined, 
the Respondent specifically admitted that the charges associated with the irrigation system 
upgrade included invoicing for providing irrigation water to four Belmont and Emerald lots. 
Respondent also acknowledged that the Riedesel invoicing was charged to Triple Crown 
incurred during the Belmont and Emerald development phase. 
Finally, the example of the expenses claims being allowed by the District Court to 
include items which had no bearing on Triple Crown are further examples of errors not 
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supported by substantial or competent evidence, but rather were admitted to as not included in 
Triple Crown at all. 
Under these circumstances, this Court should find that the District Court's ruling was in 
error and remand for further proceedings. 
Dated this16th day of August, 2017 
GERY W. EDSON, P.A., 
By~~~l--""--"'-Gf'-'c--:l'r'E~~~~~~~~ 
Gery W. Eds 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of August, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to the following parties by the method(s) indicated below: 
Andrew B. Wright 
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
1440 Blue Lakes Blvd. N. 
P.O. Box 5678 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-5678 
Email: A Wright@WrightBrothersLaw.com 
Facsimile: (208) 733-1669 
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
IZJ U.S. Mail D Overnight Mail D Facsimile IZJ E-Mail Attachment D Hand Delivery 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 8 
